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Arbitrary European Borders and
Population Transfers: International Law
and the Oder-Neisse Line
I. INTRODUCTION
During the end of the twentieth century, post-war Europe has
changed dramatically. One example of such change is the reunifica-
tion of Germany. Reunification corrected some of the wrongs com-
mitted after World Wars I and II, and allowed the majority of
Germans to share a single homeland. Many Germans, however, were
not a part of reunification because the agreements following World
Wars I and II removed them from their homeland. Consequently, the
reunification of East and West Germany did not affect them. Article
23 of the Federal Constitution of Germany, however, includes these
displaced Germans. As a result the German government has a duty
to protect their rights, and return them to their proper homeland.'
This Comment examines the legality of the current border be-
tween Germany and Poland.2 This Comment first examines the his-
torical composition of the Eastern Territories of Germany, and the
Polish claim to these territories. Second, it analyzes the creation and
establishment of the German-Polish border from the years immedi-
ately following World War I, through World War II and the War
Conferences. Third, this Comment applies international legal princi-
ples to the annexation of territory and the right of self-determination.
In conclusion, this Comment will highlight the modern developments
in territorial sovereignty, and will suggest ways to correct the injus-
tices of the past.
II. BACKGROUND: THE HISTORICAL COMPOSITION OF THE
EASTERN TERRITORIES OF GERMANY
The Eastern Territories of Germany, or Oder-Neisse Territories,
3
are those areas that were within German borders as of December 31,
1. DJURA NINtIt, THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CHARTER AND IN THE
PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 107 (1970).
2. The current German-Polish border runs from the city of Swinemiinde on the Baltic
Sea, to just west of the city of Stettin, and down the Oder and Western Neisse rivers to the
Czech Republic.
3. For a detailed representation of the exact boundaries of each of these territories, see
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1937. The Allied Powers placed these areas under Polish administra-
tion following World War II.4 This Comment will focus primarily on
the territories of Silesia, East Prussia, and Pomerania, although it will
also discuss West Prussia and Posen as part of the historic German
Eastern Territories.
5
Germanic peoples originally inhabited East Prussia in the late
Bronze Age.6 Over the next several centuries Prussia incorporated
this territory into its empire.7 When the Teutonic Knights conquered
the Prussians in the Middle Ages, they settled the area in great
number.8 Despite several changes in territorial administration, the
German population of East Prussia continued to grow. 9
Even though the Poles defeated the Teutonic Order in 1466, the
territory did not become part of Poland. 10 Prussia again incorporated
the area into its Kingdom in 1620, and it remained under Prussian
rule until the unification of the German Empire in 1871.11 East Prus-
sia, although separated from the rest of Germany by the Treaty of
Versailles in 1919,12 maintained roughly the same population and
boundaries throughout history until 1945.
I 3
Silesia and Pomerania do not have the same history of undivided
German occupation that East Prussia has. Both Slavs and Germans
migrated from Eurasia into these areas in about 2000 B.C. I4 There is
some controversy, however, over which group first settled the territo-
map facing page 233 in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES,
DIPLOMATIC PAPERS: THE CONFERENCES AT MALTA AND YALTA 1945 (1955).
4. Id.
5. The Treaty of Versailles gave West Prussia and Posen to Poland in 1919. PHILIP A.
BOHLER, THE ODER-NEISSE LINE: A REAPPRAISAL UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 3
(1990).
6. "Excavations of prehistoric material have revealed that in about the tenth century
B.C., the original Germanic culture in the North German coastlands spread eastward as far as
the lower Vistula [river]." THE GERMAN EAST 9 (Karl Pagel ed., 1954). See also GERMANY'S
EASTERN TERRITORIES: A EUROPEAN PROBLEM 40 (Peter Aurich ed., 1961) [hereinafter
GERMANY'S EASTERN TERRITORIES] (Ever since the so-called transmigration of peoples, East
Prussia had been the home of that Baltic people known as the Prusses.).
7. BOHLER, supra note 5, at 8.
8. Id.
9. Dr. Herbert Kraus, The Status Under International Law of the Eastern Territories of
Germany 46 (February, 1963) (unpublished manuscript, Gottingen Research Committee).
10. Id.
11. BOHLER, supra note 5, at 8-9.
12. Id. at 9.




ries.15 The majority of evidence indicates that the Slavs encountered
Germans when they migrated to Central Europe. 16 Despite a second
Slavonic influx into Silesia and Pomerania in the sixth century A.D.,
these areas remained under German influence.'7 Polish ethnological
groups never completely inhabited Silesia and Pomerania.'8
In the Middle Ages, Pomerania and Silesia fought bitterly
against Polish expansion attempts.' 9 Pomerania formed several in-
dependent duchies where Germans settled.20 During the Middle
Ages, Pomerania remained under German administration and Sile-
sia21 aligned with the King of Bohemia.22 This link with Bohemia
made Silesia an integral part of the medieval German Empire. 23
Later, it incorporated into the Habsburg Empire, from which it fell
under the Prussian crown in 1742.24 When Prussia integrated into the
German Empire in the unification of 1871, each of the Oder-Neisse
Territories of Germany united under a single German authority for
the first time.
25
Polish nationalists of the twentieth century, however, do not
view the historical settlement with sympathy towards the German
population.26 For example, J.M. Winiewicz, one of the leading Polish
writers on the Oder-Neisse border, believes that "the Oder was a nat-
ural barrier separating Germany from the state of Poland, which had
arisen at the end of the [tenth] century. ' 27 Winiewicz bases his posi-
tion on a statement by the German Emperor Frederich Barbarossa,
15. Id.
16. BOHLER, supra note 5, at 6. See also GERMANY'S EASTERN TERRITORIES, supra
note 6, at 6 (Silesia was originally settled by Germanic tribes, from one of which it takes its
name).
17. "[I]t may also be recalled that before the Slavs began to wander westward towards
eastern and central Germany in the 6th century A.D., these areas were inhabited by Germanic
tribes." Kraus, supra note 9, at 46.
18. "The Province of Pomerania was inhabited by the Pomeranian tribe, which was...
Slavonic, but did not belong to the Polish ethnological group. Large parts of Silesia were in
early historical times also inhabited by Slavonic, but not by Polish ethnological groups." Id.
19. Id. at 46-47.
20. The Duke of West Pomerania was made a German Imperial Prince by Emperor
Friedrich Barbarossa in 1180. Id. at 47.
21. Id.
22. Kraus, supra note 9, at 47.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. BOHLER, supra note 5, at 9.
26. J.M. WINIEWICZ, THE POLISH-GERMAN FRONTIER 11 (1945).
27. Id.
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regarding the Prussian invasion of Poland in 1157.28 The statement
reads: "On August 22nd [1157], despite the opposition of the Poles
who were lying in wait, with our entire army we crossed the river
Oder, which, like a wall, surrounds that State; and, sweeping through
the bishoprics of Breslau and Poznan, we laid waste the whole coun-
try with fire and sword."'
29
In any case, historical analysis does not usually bend to the will
of either partisans or nationalists. No one had suggested that the
Oder river serve as a boundary between Germany and Poland until
the Teheran Conference of 1943. The German empire in 1157 in-
cluded the territories east of the Oder, specifically East and West
Prussia, Posen, Pomerania, and Silesia. 30 While the Poles adminis-
tered both Breslau and Posnan during the Middle Ages, the German
population had greatly increased by the time of the Emperor's inva-
sion.31 Indeed, just two centuries later, the Kingdom of Poland offi-
cially recognized the territories as part of the Kingdom of Bohemia.32
III. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
A. World War I and After
The events following World War I set the stage for modem
German-Polish relations.3 3 The Treaty of Versailles ("Treaty"),
34
which officially ended World War I in 1919, established a new bound-
ary between Germany and Poland. In establishing this boundary, the
Treaty awarded several German territories to Poland.3 5 Theoreti-
cally, the Allied Powers claimed to have given Poland only those ter-
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. "All the German territories lying east of the river Oder are distinguished by being
very thinly populated, by being economically on a much lower standard than the rest of Ger-
many, and finally by a continued tendency on the part of the population to abandon these areas
and wander off to the west of Germany." Although these conclusions are untrue, this state-
ment does show that Winiewicz recognizes Germany in the Middle Ages as including territo-
ries east of the Oder. Id.
31. Kraus, supra note 9, at 47.
32. Id. In the Treaty of Trentschin (1335), the King of Poland "finally renounced his
claim to Silesia in favor of the King of Bohemia." Id. See also THE MARTYRDOM OF SILESIAN
PRIESTS 1945/46 6 (Kirchliche Hilfsstelle ed., 1950).
33. "Neither Polish nor German ambitions can be blamed for the outbreak of World War
I - yet its settlement in the Treaty of Versailles created the basis for Polish-German tensions
that have continued to the present day." FRIEDRICH VON WILPERT, THE ODER-NEISSE
PROBLEM 122 (1964).




ritories with an indisputably Polish population. 36 But in fact, "the
treaty awarded to Poland, in defiance of ethnographic considerations,
numerous strongly German towns and districts for military or eco-
nomic reasons."' 37 For example, despite the fact that Posen and West
Prussia contained 22% more Germans than Poles, and that West
Prussia was overwhelmingly German, the Allied Powers gave both
areas to Poland without an historically adequate justification. 38 Addi-
tionally, Poland received portions of Pomerania "without the slightest
ethnographical justification. ' '39
Some areas with mixed nationalities, such as East Prussia and
Silesia, held plebiscites4° in order to determine whether their territory
should be placed under German or Polish administration. 41 The aver-
age vote in these territories favored German administration by 78%,
and Polish administration by 22%. East Prussia strongly favored
German control with 95% of the population voting to remain Ger-
man. 42 Silesia had a larger Polish population than East Prussia, but
still retained a German majority of 60%. 4 3 Although the majority of
Silesians decided in favor of fusing with Germany, 44 the Treaty of
Versailles gave those portions of Silesia with an almost exclusively
Polish composition to Poland, while allowing the remaining territory
to stay in Germany. 45
Despite the percentage of Germans in these territories, duress of
hunger and defeat forced Germany to officially recognize the Treaty
of Versailles. The relevant portion of the agreement states:
Germany, in conformity with the action already taken by the Al-
lied and Associated Powers, recognizes the complete independence
of Poland, and renounces in her favour all rights and title over the
territory bounded by the Baltic Sea; the eastern frontier of Ger-
many as laid down in Article 27 of Part II (Boundaries of Ger-
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. The Paris Peace Conference, 6 FOREIGN REL. 832 (1919).
39. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 34, at 209.
40. A plebiscite is a vote of the people that expresses their choice for or against a pro-
posed law or enactment, which, if adopted, will work a change in the constitution that is
beyond the powers of the regular legislative body. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1153 (6th ed.
1990).
41. Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran, The "Requirement" of Plebiscite in Territorial Rap-
prochement, 12 Hous. J. INT'L L. 23, 28 (1989).
42. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 3, at map facing 233.
43. Id.
44. BOHLER, supra note 5, at 10; Rudrakumaran, supra note 41, at 28.
45. BOHLER, supra note 5, at 10.
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many) of the present Treaty up to a point situated about 2
kilometres to the east of Lorzendorf, then a line to the acute angle
which the northern boundary of Upper Silesia makes about 3
kilometres north-west of Simmenau, then the boundary of Upper
Silesia to its meeting point with the old frontier between Germany
and Russia, then this frontier to the point where it crosses the
course of the Niemen, and then the northern frontier of East Prus-
sia as laid down in Article 28 of Part II aforesaid. 46
The cession of German territory to Poland, although accepted in
the Treaty of Versailles, did not have unanimous support in Europe.
Rather, the settlement "sowed the seeds of discord in [C]entral Eu-
rope."' 47 France supported Poland's claim to the territories, with the
aim of shrinking Germany as much as possible. In response to
France's support of Poland's claim, however, President Woodrow
Wilson commented that "[t]he only real interest of France in Poland
is in weakening Germany by giving Poland territory to which she has
no right."' 48 British, Italian, and other world leaders added that the
enlargement of Poland at the expense of Germany was an error full of
menace for the peace of Europe.49 These warnings, unfortunately, fell
on deaf ears, and the agreement which was intended to be final merely
ensured the necessity of future agreements. 50
B. World War II
1. Unconditional Military Surrender
Germany ended its involvement in World War II when it signed
the Act of Military Surrender ("Act").5' The Act stated: "We, the
undersigned, acting by the authority of the German High Command,
hereby surrender unconditionally to the Supreme Commander, Allied
Expeditionary Force and simultaneously to the Soviet High Com-
46. Article 27 of Part II defines the new German-Polish border including the so-called
"Polish Corridor." Article 28 describes the Polish boundary with East Prussia, to the east of
the Corridor and to the north of Poland, which had formerly been under Russian jurisdiction.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 34, at 208.
47. The border settlement in the Treaty of Versailles furthered resentment among Ger-
many, Poland and France. VON WILPERT, supra note 33, at 123.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Isaiah Bowman, The Strategy of Territorial Decisions, 24 FOREIGN AFF. 177, 180
(1946). "The economic arrangements were bad and the subsequent failure was inevitable,
whatever boundaries were delimited." Id. See also George F. Kennan, For the Defense of
Europe: A New Approach, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1954, at 68.
51. HERBERT FEIS, BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE 14 (1960).
490 [Vol. 15:485
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mand all forces on land, sea, and in the air who are at this date under
German control." 52 The Act provided only for military surrender. 53
It did not grant the Allied Powers supreme power over Germany,54
nor did it provide for an unconditional political surrender."5
On February 22, 1944, Winston Churchill explained Germany's
surrender in his statement to the House of Commons:
The term 'unconditional surrender' does not mean that the Ger-
man people will be enslaved or destroyed! It means however that
the Allies will not be bound to them at the moment of surrender by
any pact or obligation. There will be, for instance, no question of
the Atlantic Charter applying to Germany as a matter of right and
barring territorial transferences or adjustments in enemy countries
.... Unconditional surrender means that the victors have a free
hand. It does not mean that they are entitled to behave in a barba-
rous manner nor that they wish to blot out Germany from among
the nations of Europe. If we are bound, we are bound by our own
consciences to civilization. We are not to be bound to the
Germans as the result of a bargain struck. That is the meaning of
'unconditional surrender.' 56
According to Churchill, the terms of surrender do not give the victo-
rious powers unlimited license to act in any manner that suits their
purposes. Therefore, the Allied Powers had no right to delineate new
eastern German frontiers5 7
The provisions of the Atlantic Charter ("Charter") 8 clearly ap-
plied to Germany. The signatories of the Charter did not indicate an
52. Id.
53. Philip E. Mosely, Dismemberment of Germany, 28 FOREIGN AFF. 487, 496 (1950).
54. Id.
55. Kraus, supra note 9, at 12.
56. 4 WINSTON CHURCHILL, THE SECOND WORLD WAR 618 (1950), in Kraus, supra
note 9, at 115-16.
57. Kraus, supra note 9, at 115-16.
58. Articles 1-4 of the Atlantic Charter of August 14th, 1941, read as follows:
Joint declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime
Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United King-
dom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in
the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a
better future for the world.
First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other; Second, they desire
to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of
the peoples concerned; Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form
of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and
self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.
ATLANTIC CHARTER arts. 1-4.
1993]
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intention to exclude Germany. 59 Indeed, some of the signatories ex-
pressed the belief that the Charter applied to Germany as a matter of
right.60 The evidence clearly does not support the contention that the
Charter does not apply to Germany, but only to those who signed it.6
l
Further, the signatories of the Charter incorporated the right of self-
determination into the post-war international order, and they gave
those living in the Oder-Neisse Territories the right to choose their
national identity.
62
2. The War Conferences
The Big Three Powers, consisting of the United States, the
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, held three War Conferences
during and following World War II. Each conference purported to
establish a plan for the resolution of the war, the settlement of territo-
ries and the agreement of reparation issues. The first conference took
place in Teheran from November 28 through December 1, 1943; the
second, from February 4 through 11, 1945, at Yalta; and the third
and final conference from was July 17 through August 2, 1945, at
Potsdam. Neither Germany nor Poland participated in any of the
War Conferences.
a. Teheran
At the Teheran Conference, the Big Three Powers set forth their
individual plans for peace and settlement of territory. During the
Conference, Soviet Premier Josef Stalin suggested that the Oder river
be the western boundary of Poland.63 The Neisse river, however, was
not a part of this package. 64 The Soviet Union took a large portion of
the eastern Polish territory, drawing the border at the Curzon Line,
65
and attempted to move Poland as a whole approximately 200 miles
west of its historic location. 66 "The Soviet motive was both to 'com-
pensate' and strengthen Poland and to weaken Germany."' 67 Church-
59. CHURCHILL, supra note 56, in Kraus, supra note 9, at 115-16.
60. Id.
61. BOHLER, supra note 5, at 19.
62. NINeIt, supra note 1, at 221.
63. BOHLER, supra note 5, at 21.
64. THE GENESIS OF THE ODER-NEISSE LINE 69 (Gotthold Rhode & Wolfgang Wagner
eds., 1959) [hereinafter GENESIS].
65. The Curzon Line is the original name for the current border between Poland and the
former Soviet Union.
66. WOLFGANG WAGNER, DIE ENTSTEHUNG DER ODER-NEISSE-LINIE 56-57 (1953).
67. Id. at 61.
[Vol. 15:485492
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ill, on behalf of the Western Allies, agreed to a compromise border
package in order to retain his influence with the Soviets.68 Philip
Biihler discusses the idea that in return for Poland giving up its terri-
tory east of the Curzon Line, the Big Three would support Polish
claims for land at Germany's expense: 69
The "compensation theory" has no basis in prior state practice,
except possibly in friendly treaties where all of the parties involved
negotiated and agreed to the settlement for mutual benefit. The
westward movement of Poland was decided upon without the par-
ticipation of either Poland or Germany, the two nations that would
lose territory. As a legal argument it is almost devoid of weight. 70
Although the Big Three Powers agreed in principle to the border
package, they reached no formal agreements at the Teheran Confer-
ence.71 Churchill, for example, stated clearly to Stalin that neither he
nor President Franklin D. Roosevelt had the power to define any
frontier lines. 72 Thus, Teheran merely set the stage for future negotia-
tions at Yalta and Potsdam.73
b. Yalta
The Yalta Conference marked a major shift in Anglo-Russo-
American relations. At Teheran, the Big Three Powers only dis-
cussed general possibilities for potential borders. At Yalta, however,
the Soviets attempted to expand those previous discussions and give
them binding force. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Molotov out-
68. BOHLER, supra note 5, at 21.
69. 1157 - and all that, THE ECONOMIST, May 3, 1947 at 662. According to THE
ECONOMIST:
Compensation implies a legal or moral right to that for which compensatory pay-
ment is to be made . . . . [A]ccording to the Soviet view, Poland had no right
whatever to the eastern territories [now in Russia], which had been brutally seized
from their rightful owners by Polish reactionaries and imperialists. How then has
Poland a just claim to compensation for the loss of something to which it never had
any right at all?
Id.
70. BOHLER, supra note 5, at 23.
71. "The declaration issued at the conclusion of the Teheran Conference made no men-
tion of any territorial agreements, specific or general, formalising the obvious lack of agree-
ment among the Big Three." Id. at 21. See also President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address of
the President of the United States Before a Joint Session of the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives on the Subject of the Yalta Conference (Mar. 1, 1945), in 79 CONG. REC. 1619
(1945) (Among the civilian leaders at Teheran,.. . [n]o political arrangements were made, and
none was attempted).
72. GENESIS, supra note 64, at 63.
73. WAGNER, supra note 66, at 65-66.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.V1
lined his country's position on Poland's frontiers at the opening of the
conference:
1.... that the Curzon Line should be the eastern frontier of Po-
land, with adjustments in some regions of five to eight kilometers
in favour of Poland.
2.... that the western frontier of Poland should be drawn from the
town of Stettin (which would be Polish), and thence southwards
along the river Oder and Western Neisse.74
Molotov suggested that the conferees agree on "the return to Poland
of her ancient frontiers in East Prussia and on the Oder."' 7 5 He was
unsuccessful, however, in persuading Roosevelt and Churchill.7 6 Sta-
lin then withdrew the Soviet proposal. 77
This shift in positions was due, in large part, to the interpretation
of events occurring between the two conferences. In 1943, Henry
Morgenthau, the United States Treasury Secretary, proposed a plan
to President Roosevelt and his Cabinet which gained wide attention in
Congress and in the United States and British press.7 8 The "Morgen-
thau Plan" called for the destruction, not merely the demilitarization,
of postwar Germany.79 The plan was "just barely above the level of
'steriliz[ing] all Germans, " and "would reduce Germany from a pre-
war industrial giant to a fourth-rate nation of small farms." 80 The
main objectives of the plan were:
1. Removal from Germany of all industrial machinery which any
liberated country wants; obliteration of the rest of German
industry.
2. Permanent closing of all German mines - if any are left after
territorial changes.
3. Cession of the Saar and other Rhineland industrial areas to
France; cession of East Prussia to Poland.
74. BOHLER, supra note 5, at 24.
75. VON WILPERT, supra note 33, at 53.
76. Churchill and Roosevelt responded with the following dialogue:
President Roosevelt asked how long it had been since these lands were Polish.
Mr. Molotov replied: Very long ago, but they had once been Polish.
Said the U.S. President, laughing, to the British Prime Minister: 'Perhaps you would
want us back?'
Replied the British Prime Minister: "Well, you might be as indigestible for us as it
might be for the Poles if they took too much German territory."
Id.
77. Id.
78. The Policy of Hate, TIME, Oct. 2, 1944, at 19.
79. Id. See, e.g., DOUGLAS BOTTING, FROM THE RUINS OF THE REICH 194 (1985).
80. The Policy of Hate, supra note 78.
494 [Vol. 15:485
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4. Breakup of all large land holdings into small farms.
5. Withholding of any economic aid whatsoever to Germany; no
food, clothing or other relief supplies to be furnished to the Ger-
man people; no reconstruction of railroads or factories within Ger-
many to be permitted.
6. Prolonged occupation by Russian, British and American
troops, perhaps for a generation.
7. No reparations - since Germany would have nothing to pay
them with, and would be allowed in no way to earn payments in
the future. 81
Although the plan horrified British Foreign Secretary Anthony
Eden, United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and United
States Secretary of War Henry Stimson, 82 the Soviets believed that
President Roosevelt was leaning toward Morgenthau's agenda,83 and
therefore had an improved bargaining position at Yalta. The United
States, however, in accordance with its traditional policy, had not
committed itself to any position prior to Yalta.84
At Yalta, Churchill and Roosevelt clearly refused to agree on the
enlarged Polish claim.8 5 Indeed, the Report of the Crimea [Yalta]
Conference showed their desire not to create any binding agree-
ments. 86 By including the Western Neisse in their proposal, the Sovi-
ets now incorporated into Polish territory an area that included
several million Germans and very few Poles.87 These Germans would
face expulsion from their traditional homeland as a result of this pro-




84. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 3, at 215. See also Edward Stettinius, United States
Policy Toward Poland, in DEP'T ST. BULL., (Dec. 24, 1944), at 836, reprinted in U.S. CONG., A
DECADE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: BASIc DOCUMENTS 1941-49 1195 (1950) (The
United States Government continues to adhere to its traditional policy of declining to give
guarantees for any specific frontiers.).
85. VON WILPERT, supra note 33, at 68.
86. The Report of the Crimea [Yalta] Conference, issued by the Big Three Powers on
February 11, 1945, set forth the following provisions for the frontiers of Poland:
The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should
follow the Curzon Line ... and that the final delimitation of the Western frontier of
Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference (emphasis added).
BOHLER, supra note 5, at 25.
87. VON WILPERT, supra note 33, at 67. See, e.g., 1157 - and all that, supra note 69, at
662-63.
1993]
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principle for both moral and legal reasons.88
c. Potsdam
The aim of the Potsdam Conference was to ensure the complete
demilitarization of Germany.8 9 Additionally, the conferees recon-
firmed the agreements that the Big Three Powers reached at Yalta,
namely that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland
should await the peace settlement.90 The Big Three Powers stated
that they "desired not to destroy or enslave the German people but
rather to give them the opportunity to reconstruct their country and
their lives on a democratic and peaceful basis." 91 Further, according
to Articles 34, 35, and 36 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 92 any decisions made by the Big Three at Potsdam could not
have binding force on Germany, because Germany was not present at
the Conference.
93
During the Conferences, however, the Soviet Union and Poland
had already begun the process of settling Poles in Eastern Germany
and removing the German population from these territories. 94 In-
deed, the Soviet Union had placed most of the Oder-Neisse area under
Polish administration prior to the Potsdam Conference. 95 Dr. J6zef
Kokot describes the Soviet-Polish position on the Potsdam agree-
ments as follows:
At the Potsdam Conference, in the opinion of the Big Powers, Ger-
many, as a state, and the German people, as those responsible for
the Nazi rule and as those who will eventually have to form a new
government (a sovereign authority) on a democratic basis, were
fully and entirely contained within the territory of the four zones
88. The Second and Third paragraphs of the Atlantic Charter specifically forbid arbitrary
population expulsions. See ATLANTIC CHARTER, supra note 58.
89. Plan for a Continent, TIME, Aug. 13, 1945, at 28. See, e.g., Report on the Tripartite
Conference of Berlin, 13 DEP'T ST. BULL. (Aug. 5, 1945), at 155 [hereinafter Tripartite
Conference].
90. Kraus, supra note 9, at 22. See, e.g., MICHAEL FREUND, FROM COLD WAR TO
OSTPOLITIK 114 (1972).
91. Lucius D. CLAY, DECISION IN GERMANY 40 (1950).
92. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 34-36, U.N. DOC.
A/CONF. 39/27 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
93. Claus Arndt, Legal Problems of the German Eastern Treaties, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 122,
129 (1980).
94. THE EXPULSION OF THE GERMAN POPULATION FROM THE TERRITORIES EAST OF
THE ODER-NEISSE LINE 82 (Theodor Scheider et al., eds. & Vivian Stranders trans., 1961)
[hereinafter EXPULSION].
95. BOHLER, supra note 5, at 28 (emphasis added).
496 [Vol. 15:485
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of occupation under the authority of the Control Council and
within frontiers defined (in the case of the eastern frontier) by the
agreement then reached.
96
Alfons Klafkowski, a leading Polish writer on the subject of the Oder-
Neisse border, claimed that "[t]he provisions of the Potsdam Agree-
ment regarding the delimitation of the Polish-German frontier are
binding not only on the two German states but on all others as
well." '97 Klafkowski, however, fails to explain why the Potsdam pro-
visions should have binding force.
The Soviet-Polish position clearly contradicted the Four Power
Declaration and Statement Regarding Germany at Berlin, which
Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and France issued
on June 5, 1945.98 The declaration made clear that Germany's fron-
tiers exist for all purposes as of December 31, 1937.99 Further, the
Western Allies made clear at Potsdam that "the final delimitation of
the Western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement; that
Germany's Eastern Territories were being placed 'under the adminis-
tration of the Polish state' and that the Oder-Neisse boundary was in
effect 'pending the final determination of Poland's western fron-
tier.' "0 The Western Allies were outraged by the Soviet-Polish posi-
tion. 10' United States President Harry Truman, for example, wrote
the following to his Secretary of State, James Byrnes, on January 5,
1946: "At Potsdam we were faced with an accomplished fact and
were by circumstances almost forced to agree to Russian occupation
of Eastern Poland and the occupation of that part of Germany east of
the Oder River by Poland. It was a high-handed outrage."' 0 2
96. J6ZEF KOKOT, THE LOGIC OF THE ODER-NEISSE FRONTIER 48 (Andrzej Potocki
trans., 2d ed. 1959).
97. ALFONS KLAFKOWSKI, THE POLISH-GERMAN FRONTIER AFTER WORLD WAR II
23 (Edward Rothert trans., 1972).
98. BOHLER, supra note 5, at 28.
99. Focus on Germany, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1948, at 22.
100. VON WILPERT, supra note 33, at 76. See, e.g., Tripartite Conference, supra note 89, at
159; Kraus, supra note 9, at 172-76; FREUND, supra note 90, at 117; HEINZ DROGE, ET AL.,
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE UNITED NATIONS 36 (Deutsche Gesell-
schaft Fiir Auswirtige Politik ed., 1967).
101. BOHLER, supra note 5, at 28.
102. GENESIS, supra note 64, at 278.
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IV. THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE EASTERN TERRITORIES OF
GERMANY
A. Annexation and the Violation of International Law
Annexations 0 3 are illegal according to existing international
law.'°4 In fact, the International Law Commission considers interna-
tional aggression to be a crime. 10 5 Additionally, both the Atlantic
Charter 10 6 and the Charter of the United Nations forbid the aggres-
sive acquisition of territory. 107While United Nations Resolutions do
not constitute binding law, 108 the United Nations may formulate prin-
ciples of international law which exist or develop independently of
those resolutions. 109
Hersch Lauterpacht, a distinguished international legal scholar,
identifies two such general principles of international law: first, that
"it is competent for one State to pronounce judgement on the legality
of the acts of another and to determine the validity of a new title
acquired by such acts," 110 and second, that "the principle ex injuria
jus non oritur [an illegality cannot become a source of right to the
103. The term annexation is used here to refer to "the usurpation of foreign sovereignty
over a territory . . . [which] implies forcible violation of the territorial integrity of a state."
Kraus, supra note 9, at 66.
104. Id. at 73.
105. Article 19 of the Draft Articles states:
3. [O]n the basis of the rules of international law in force, an international crime
may result, inter alia, from
(a) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for
the maintenance of international peace and security, such as that prohibiting
aggression.
Draft Articles of the International Law Commission, in IAN BROWNLEE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW
OF NATIONS, STATE RESPONSIBILITY I 289 (1983) [hereinafter Draft Articles].
106. ATLANTIC CHARTER, supra note 58.
107. Articles 1(1) and 2(4) of the U.N. Charter state:
Article 1
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.
Article 2
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1,
shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1, art. 2, para. 4. See e.g., COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NA-
TIONS art. 10.
108. DROGE ET AL., supra note 100, at 72-73.
109. Id.
110. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 413, 420 (1947).
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wrongdoer] is one of the fundamental maxims of jurisprudence.""'
Under the first principle, Germany can find Poland's incorporation of
its territory invalid. According to Lauterpacht: "States themselves
are both entitled and constrained to pass judgment upon the legality
of actions by other States; the inescapable alternative would be for
them to treat such acts invariably as valid and as establishing legal
rights."1 12
Under the second principle, "acts contrary to international law
are invalid and cannot become a source of legal rights for the wrong-
doer." 13 Aggressive acquisition of territory is illegal, as it violates
principles of territorial sovereignty." 4 Annexations, therefore, do not
transfer legal title to territory." 5 Lauterpacht explains:
[T]o admit that, apart from well-defined exceptions, an unlawful
act, or its immediate consequences, may become ... a source of
legal right for the wrongdoer is to introduce into the legal system a
contradiction which cannot be solved except by a denial of its legal
character. International law does not and cannot form an excep-
tion to that imperative alternative.11
6
If Poland had continued to merely administer the German Eastern
Territories, rather than officially and unilaterally incorporate them, it
would not have violated international law, as administration is a rec-
ognized type of legal entity in international law."17
1. The Annexation of Eastern Germany
Under international law, the legal determination of the status of
the territories between the Oder river (the current "border" between
Germany and Poland) and the 1937 border rests on the legal defini-
tion of nationality.,18 The principle of self-determination, which has
governed the recognition of national integrity since World War I, is
grounded in ethnic habitation and historical and cultural continuity.
Since the twelfth century, Germans have resided in the disputed
111. Id. at 420.
112. Id. at 413.
113. Id. at 420.
114. Id. at 421.
115. Id.
116. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 110, at 421.
117. BOHLER, supra note 5, at 38. Cf LAUTERPACHT, supra note 110, at 58 (A state
cannot acquire title to territory by acquisitive prescription if it merely adminisiers territory
belonging to another state.).
118. Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points, in 4 FRANK H. SIMONDS, HISTORY OF THE
WORLD WAR IV 334, 335 (1919).
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Eastern Territories. 119 Census records of the inter-war era establish
the German composition of the people in the Territories. 120 The 1931
census indicates the following percentages of German population in
lands ceded to Poland at Potsdam: East Prussia, 98%; Danzig/
Memel, 90%; East Pomerania/East Brandenburg, 99%; and Silesia,
97%.121
The United Nations recognized the status of these lands as ethnic
homelands to the Germans and the status of its inhabitants as refu-
gees from their historic habitation after the expulsions in 1980.122 In
Resolution 124 of 11 December 1980, the General Assembly recog-
nized the plight of those ethnic Germans who had lost legal status and
were expelled. 123 This Resolution reaffirms the "right of refugees to
return to their homes in their homelands." 124 It states that "massive
flows of refugees may not only affect the domestic order and stability
of receiving States but also jeopardize the stability of entire regions
and thus endanger international peace and security." 125 It also invites
all "[m]ember States to convey to the Secretary-General their com-
ments and suggestions on international co-operation to avert new
flows of refugees and to facilitate the return of those refugees who
wish to return." 126
Dr. Herbert Kraus sets forth a three-part test to determine
whether a nation has annexed territory in violation of international
law. First, annexation requires a forcible action, which can include an
official action by the state.127 Second, the annexation must display an
intention to annex, and demonstrate its aspiration to another's territo-
rial sovereignty. 128 Finally, the annexing nation must physically oc-
cupy the territory. 129 Dr. Kraus' test finds support in the Treaties,
Charters, and general international legal principles discussed
above. 130
119. See supra notes 8-20 and accompanying text.
120. Fritz Peter Habel, Deutsche im dstlichen Europa: Zur Vorgeschichte der Vertreibung,
reprinted in GEFLOHEN UND VERTRIEBEN 68-69 (Rudolf Muhlfenzl ed., 1981).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 46.
123. International Co-Operation to Avert New Flows of Refugees, G.A. Res. 124, U.N.




127. Kraus, supra note 9, at 70.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
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Poland and the Soviet Union unilaterally annexed the Eastern
German Territories. The July 10, 1951 edition of the New York
Times states:
The fact is that of the pre-war Germany, whose 1937 borders have
been acknowledged as legal in the four-power military agreement
of June 5, 1945, pending a peace settlement, the Soviets and Poland
have unilaterally annexed 24 percent, that the Soviets control an-
other 24 percent in the Soviet zone, and that the Federal Republic
constitutes only 53 percent of pre-war Germany.13'
Klafkowski, in his explanation of the official Polish position,
states that Poland does not treat the Oder-Neisse Territories as Ger-
man land under Polish administration, but rather as belonging to the
Polish state. 132 Others share this view as well, writing that "Poland
proceeded to expel the German inhabitants from the territories
brought under its administration and to incorporate parts of these ter-
ritories, and eventually all of them, into the Polish state."'' 33
Poland clearly intended to exercise its sovereignty over the Oder-
Neisse Territories. Poland has displayed all the activities of a state
that maintains territorial sovereignty over the Territories. 1 34 Poland's
December 13, 1945, Decree of Administration of the Recovered Ter-
ritories stated the following regarding activities belonging to the terri-
torial sovereign:
With the installation of the civil administration, the Recovered
Territories were fused with the remaining area of the Polish state
on a basis of complete equality. From then on all laws and regula-
tions passed for the whole Polish state became binding in the Re-
covered Territories as well. All laws and regulations inconsistent
with the legal order recognized by the Polish state, however,
ceased to apply .... This principle is implicit in the very concept of
sovereignty. 135
Since Poland has also physically occupied the Eastern Territories of
Germany, its actions towards the Territories qualify as an illegal
annexation.
131. Toward Peace With Germany, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1951, at 26.
132. KLAFKOWSKI, supra note 97, at 56. "The exercise of government in the Recovered
Territories is carried out by Poland in its own name; accordingly it is no longer a question
which belongs to the province of international law, but is a matter of Polish national legisla-
tion, constitutional and administrative." Id.
133. James K. Pollock, American Policy Toward Germany, 23 FOR. POL. RPTs. 199
(1947).
134. MANFRED LACHS, THE POLISH-GERMAN FRONTIER 39 (1964).
135. KLAFKOWSKI, supra note 97, at 60. See also Kraus, supra note 9, at 71.
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Poland also claims that Germany and Poland had a contract of
cession, transferring the sovereignty of the Eastern Territories to Po-
land. 36 However, no contract of cession exists between Germany and
Poland. 137 The German Federal Government has never transferred
title to the Oder-Neisse Territories, as evidenced by the following
statement of German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer on July 9, 1950:
The decision on the Eastern German Territories at present under
Polish and Soviet administration cannot and will not be [made]
until a peace treaty is concluded with a united Germany. The Ger-
man Federal Government, as the spokesman for the entire German
nation, will never accept the annexation, contrary to every princi-
ple of law and humanity, of these purely German territories.
13 8
By failing the three-pronged test for annexation, and never obtaining
Germany's agreement to a transfer of sovereignty, Poland clearly an-
nexed the Oder-Neisse Territories in violation of international law.
B. The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination
Self-determination is a foundational and inviolable principle in
international law. It originated in the teachings of Erasmus of Rotter-
dam, and was adopted in the works of the "three great classical teach-
ers of international law, Grotius, Pufendorf and Vattel."' 139 During
the nineteenth century European revolutions, self-determination
gained great notoriety, incorporating the principle of nationality de-
rived from the Italian non-interventionist school.140 Subsequently, it
appeared in the Draft Articles of the International Law Commission,
the Atlantic Charter, and the Charter of the United Nations. 141 Dr.
136. According to Klafkowski, "[t]his part of the territory of the German Reich which the
Potsdam Agreement allotted to Poland, is an object of particular cession." Kraus, supra note
9, at 139-40.
137. Id. at 70.
138. VON WILPERT, supra note 33, at 87-88. See also Konrad Adenauer, Statement to the
Bundestag on Foreign Policy (Oct. 20, 1953), in GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS
SINCE 1871 227 (Louise Holborn et al. eds., 1970) (the German people will never recognize the
so-called Oder-Neisse frontier).
139. Kraus, supra note 9, at 101.
140. "[T]he principle of nationality consisted in the demand that each nation should be
recognized the right to form its own sovereign state and, more generally, to decide its own
destiny - in other words, to determine itself." NINtIt, supra note 1, at 219 (emphasis in
original).
141. ILC Draft Article 19 states:
3. [O]n the basis of the rules of international law in force, an international crime
may result, inter alia, from ...
(b) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for
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Kraus provides a definition of the right of peoples to self-
determination:
Self-determination in the sense used here and in the usual sense
means that a nation, or specific national groups, should be given
the last word in deciding whether they should continue to belong
to their mother country or whether they should refuse this, unless
it is a case of constituting a state of their own, of amalgamating
with another state or associating with its population or part of the
same for the purpose of establishing a new state.
142
Self-determination can be the right of a group wishing to separate
from a country (positive self-determination), as well as the right of a
group wishing to maintain their connection with a country (negative
self-determination). 143
A further source of the right of self-determination is found in
natural law. 144 Dr. Kraus quotes the German Federal Supreme
Court:
Military conquest does not give the victor the right to deprive the
conquered people of their national sovereignty, which has been
handed down in history and which the nation wishes to preserve
within the system of international order. This is a peremptory rule
of natural law which has already been widely recognized in specific
international law as the right of self-determination of peoples. It
safeguarding the right of self-determination of peoples, such as that prohibiting the
establishment or maintenance by force of colonial domination.
Draft Articles, supra note 105, at 289-90. Articles 1(2) and 55 of the U.N. Charter read:
Article 1
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate meas-
ures to strengthen universal peace.
Article 55
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are neces-
sary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the princi-
ple of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall
promote:
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, para. 2; 55. ATLANTIC CHARTER, supra note 58, arts. 1-3. Cf Decla-
ration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N.
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) ("The territory of a colony or
other Non-Self-Governing Territory has, under the Charter, a status separate and distinct
from the territory of the State administering it").
142. Kraus, supra note 9, at 96.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 105-06.
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would be logical to extend this principle also to inroads upon
territory.1
45
Given the debate over the legal status of the United Nations Charter
provisions, 146 natural law plays a fundamental role in establishing the
legal right of self-determination.
Under natural law, self-determination not only gives a mother
country the right to protect its national groups, but imposes the af-
firmative duty to do so. 147 For example, Article 116 of the Basic Law
for the Federal Republic of Germany provides both citizenship and
protection for all Germans within its borders as of December 31,
1937.148 Additionally, the Preamble states that the German people, in
enacting the Basic Law, have acted on behalf of those Germans de-
nied participation in the political process, thus fulfilling the country's
duty to the residents of the Eastern Territories. 149 Germany's adher-
ence to the validity of the 1937 borders, therefore, goes beyond its
desire for territory: it recognizes its positive duty under the natural
law principle of self-determination to protect the rights of its citizens
in the Eastern Territories.
The plebiscites held in the Eastern Territories following World
War I resulted from the recognition of the right to self-determina-
tion. 150 Indeed, the concept of plebiscite is one of the three theoretical
bases to the principle of self-determination.' 5 ' For example, President
Woodrow Wilson stated in a message to the United States Senate that
"[p]eoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another
as if they were property," a sentiment that other Allied leaders
echoed. 152 The results of these plebiscites showed a clear German
145. Id. at 155.
146. "Even if the absence of a definition of self-determination does not impair the legally
binding nature of the relevant Charter provisions, it does ... preclude it from constituting a
norm of international aw as distinct from a legal principle." NINtII(, supra note 1, at 245. But
see DR6GE, supra note 100, at 72-73 (Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly which
contain comments on legal questions do not in themselves constitute binding law but may
formulate a norm of general international law).
147. Kraus, supra note 9, at 107.
148. BAsic LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (Constitution) art. 116
para. 1, 2 (F.R.G.) [hereinafter BASiC LAW].
149. BASIC LAW pmbl.
150. Rudrakumaran, supra note 41, at 28.
151. Id. at 37. Cf Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, art. 15, G.A. Res. 217, U.N.
Doe A/810, at 73 (1948) (No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality.).
152. Rudrakumaran, supra note 41, at 36 ("Prime Minister Lloyd George of Great Britain
asserted that the general principle of national self-determination is 'as applicable in their cases
of German colonies as in those of occupied European territories.' ").
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majority in most of the Eastern Territories and an overall desire to
remain in Germany.5 3 However, following World War II, the Allied
leaders attempted to retain influence with the Soviet Union by disre-
garding the wishes of the people (in violation of Article 2 of the At-
lantic Charter)' 54 and formed borders based on political compromise.
The Eastern Territories have held no plebiscites under Polish admin-
istration, a fact which unfortunately has no explanation.
The issue of the Oder-Neisse border is primarily one of self-deter-
mination.'5 Political considerations should not mitigate shifting Po-
land's border westward, when such an action intrudes upon the right
of people to live at peace in their homeland.1 56 A modern and demo-
cratic world cannot subordinate human rights in favor of political
considerations. 157
C. International Law and Human Rights
Natural law provides the foundation for the protection of human
rights, 5 8 in recognizing that certain rights are inherent in the individ-
ual. 159 A state can neither grant nor rescind these rights; rather, it
can only protect against their violation. 160 These rights are imposed
by a superior legal order, transcending state boundaries. 16 1 Natural
law protects the individual from the state, through both domestic and
international legal norms, and provides individuals with international
legal safeguards. 162 Natural law "endow[s] individuals with a certain
personality in, and eventually makes them into subjects of, interna-
tional law."'1
63
Several recent charters and treaties have codified the natural law
153. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
154. ATLANTIC CHARTER, supra note 58, art. 2.
155. Herbert Marzian, Die Oder-Neisse-Linie Im Lichte Des Volkerrechts, in DEUTSCH-
LAND UND POLEN 1772-1945 211 (Helmuth Fechner ed., 1964).
156. ERNST R.B. HANSEN, POLENS DRANG NACH DEM WESTEN 31-33 (1927).
157. International Treaty on Civil and Political Rights, reprinted in VERLETZUNGEN VON
MENSCHENRECHTEN 115 (Kulturstiftung der deutschen Vertriebenen ed. 1985). See, e.g.,
HERBERT KRAUS, DIE ODER-NEISSE-LINIE 14 (1954).
158. NINtIt, supra note 1, at 193. See, e.g., HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 112 (1950).
159. NINeI1, supra note 1, at 193.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id at 193-94.
163. Id. at 194. "Traces of these ideas are to be found in Grotius, Pufendorf and in a more
precise form, in Hefter, Fiorea, Bluntschli, and, in more recent times, in Westlake, Lapradelle
and others." Id. at 194 n.1.
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concept of human rights, defining those rights "inherent in the indi-
vidual."' 64 For example, one of the main goals of the United Nations
Charter is "to reaffrm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dig-
nity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women and of nations large and small." 165 Subsequent articles in the
Charter list several of these rights, such as self-determination, free-
dom from discrimination based on race, sex, language or religion, so-
cial and economic progress and development, and freedom from
aggression.1 66 The Atlantic Charter also incorporates these rights
into its provisions.' 67
In order to further codify and secure the rights of the individual
in positive international law, the United Nations proclaimed the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948,168 and enacted the In-
ternational Bill of Human Rights in 1976.169 The Universal
Declaration provides a comprehensive list of the rights of the individ-
ual protected under international law. Among these protections are
the rights that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, deten-
tion or exile,"' 170 that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
nationality,"' 71 and that "[n]othing in this Declaration may be inter-
preted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage
in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any
of the rights and freedoms set forth herein."'' 72
The Universal Declaration was codified in the 1976 International
Bill of Human Rights ("The Bill"). The Bill contains three separate
instruments: (1) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights; (2) The International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights; and (3) The Optional Protocol to the latter Covenant.' 73
Each instrument provides all peoples with the right of self-determina-
tion and the right to freely determine their political status and pursue
economic, social, and cultural development. 74 Under the Civil and
164. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
165. Id.
166. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, paras. 2, 3; 2, para. 4; 68.
167. ATLANTIC CHARTER, supra note 58.
168. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 151.
169. Id.
170. Id. art. 9.
171. Id. art. 15.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 1, para. 1, G.A.
Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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Political Covenant, individuals who are lawfully in the territory of a
party to the covenant may "be expelled therefrom only in pursuance
of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except where
compelling reasons of national security require, be allowed to submit
the reasons against [their] expulsion and have [their] case reviewed by
... the competent authority."' 75 Each covenant also provides that its
provisions shall extend to all parts of Federal States such as Germany
without any limitations or exceptions.
76
Germany accepted the United Nations Declaration of Human
Rights in its Constitution. The relevant sections of the Basic Law for
the Federal Republic of Germany state:
Article 1
(1) The dignity of man is inviolable. To respect and protect it is
the duty of all state authority.
(2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and ina-
lienable human rights as the basis of every human community, of
peace and of justice in the world.
(3) The following basic rights are binding on the legislature, on the
executive and on the judiciary as directly valid law. 
177
The German public accepts the United Nations Declaration of
Human Rights as providing moral principles for the conduct of all
countries in national and international affairs. 78 Additionally, Ger-
many's participation in the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms demonstrates its com-
mitment to the international safeguarding of human rights.
179
1. The Expulsion of Germans from the Eastern Territories
The German population began to flee from the Eastern Territo-
ries to escape the Red Army in 1944.180 Upon occupation of the terri-
tories, the Soviets invited the Polish government to move into East
Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia.18' According to Alfred de Zayas,
one of the world's chief scholars on German expellees, "[e]victions of
175. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 13, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
176. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 174, art.
28; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 175, art. 3.
177. BASic LAW art. 1, paras. 1, 2, 3. See, e.g., Kraus, supra note 9, at 106.
178. DROGE ET AL., supra note 100, at 66.
179. Id. at 65-66.
180. EXPULSION, supra note 94, at 106-08.
181. ALFRED M. DE ZAYAS, NEMESIS AT POTSDAM: THE EXPULSION OF GERMANS
FROM THE EAST 104-05 (1988).
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the native Germans followed and frequent excesses by members of the
Soviet and Polish armed forces drove many of the Germans who had
not yet been evicted from their homes to abandon everything and flee
west."18 2 Additionally, the Polish government expelled those who
tried to stay, "regardless of the lack of any existing international sanc-
tion for the expulsion."'
183
The fanatical anti-German author, Ilya Ehrenburg, provides an
example of Soviet excesses in the territories in his book entitled The
War, distributed to the Red Army in East Prussia. 84 Ehrenburg
writes:
The Germans are not human beings .... We shall not speak any-
more .... We shall kill. If you have not killed at least one German
a day, you have wasted that day .... If you cannot kill your Ger-
man with your bullet, kill him with your bayonet. If there is calm
on your part of the front, or if you are waiting for the fighting, kill
a German in the meantime.. . . If you kill one German, kill an-
other - there is nothing more amusing to us than a heap of German
corpses .... Kill the German that is your motherland's loud re-
quest. Do not miss. Do not let through. Kill. 8 5
This genre of propaganda, although denied by Stalin as part of official
Soviet policy, 8 6 led to the eventual expulsion of nearly 12 million
Germans from the Eastern Territories. 187 As the August 13, 1945
issue of Time reported:
In what was once eastern Germany, an anguished tide of human-
ity, one of the greatest mass movements of Germans in history,
flowed toward the borders of the shrunken Reich. At least
10,000,000 hungry Germans were being uprooted from their old
homes in East Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia... by the new Polish...
and Russian owners. 188
182. Id at 105.
183. VON WILPERT, supra note 33, at 68 (emphasis added).
184. DE ZAYAS, supra note 181, at 65-66.
185. Id.
186. Id. Stalin claimed, "Sometimes we hear silly talk about the Red Army intending to
exterminate the German people and to destroy the German state. This is, of course, a stupid
lie." Id. at 66.
187. GERMANY'S EASTERN TERRITORIES, supra note 6, at 24. Peter Aurich states:
One-fourth of Germany including in all some 12,000,000 people was affected by the
compulsory expulsions that began in 1945. Their focal point was the area bordering
on the Baltic Sea and the borders of the Sudetenland. The same edict abolished
boundaries that had endured for half a millennium: namely, the borders denoting
East Prussia, Lithuania and Poland in the north as well as those between Silesia and
Poland.
188. Forced Migration, TIME, Aug. 13, 1945, at 36.
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Malcolm Proudfoot, in his study of European refugees, adds that
"[t]hese Germans, in varying degrees, experienced pillage and arson,
manslaughter, murder, rape, work in labour gangs, and imprisonment
in concentration camps."'' 19
The inhumanity of Poland and the Soviet Union was nothing
new. During the Teheran Conference of 1943, Stalin and Churchill
had the following dialogue: "Stalin said ... that he wanted to round
up fifty thousand German officers after the war and shoot them. Win-
ston Churchill was violently angry. 'I would rather be taken out in
the garden here and now to be shot myself than sully my own and my
country's honor by such infamy.' "190 Many political, academic and
religious figures denounced the 1945 expulsions. Churchill, for exam-
ple, in his famous "Iron Curtain" speech, stated that "The Russian-
dominated Polish government has been encouraged to make enor-
mous and wrongful inroads upon Germany, and mass expulsions of
millions of Germans on a scale grievous and undreamed of are now
taking place."' 9' Bertrand Russell also spoke against the expulsions,
asking the rhetorical question: "Are mass expulsions crimes only if
they are ordered by our foes in wartime - but reasonable measures
toward a new social order if our allies order them in times of
peace?"' 92 Additionally, Pope Pius XII proclaimed that "[e]very
human being has a right to his ancestral homeland, and provided he
has not disqualified himself by some personal wrong-doing, it is unjust
to expel him," 193 a sentiment also echoed by the Catholic Bishops of
Germany. 194
189. MALCOLM J. PROUDFOOT, EUROPEAN REFUGEES: 1939-52 A STUDY IN FORCED
POPULATION MOVEMENT 369-71 (1957).
190. JAMES BACQUE, OTHER LOSSES 5 (1991).
191. Winston Churchill, Alliance of English-Speaking People, Delivered at Fulton College
(Mar. 5, 1946), in 12 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 329, 331 (1946).
192. GERMANY'S EASTERN TERRITORIES, supra note 6, at 25.
193. Id.
194. CATHOLIC BISHOPS OF GERMANY, THE TRAGEDY OF SILESIA 1945-46 (foreword)
(Johannes Kaps, ed., 1952/53) The following is an excerpt from the Jan. 30, 1946 proclama-
tion by the Catholic Bishops of Germany:
We, the Catholic Bishops of Germany, feel we can no longer keep silent on the sub-
ject of the terrible fate which has befallen more than ten million people in the Ger-
man Eastern Territories .... people whose ancestors for the most part settled in this
territory seven and eight centuries ago and introduced civilization there. This dread-
ful fate has already befallen millions, indeed, in Silesia alone several millions. Their
expulsion has been effected with horrible brutality and regardless of all human rights
and feelings. We implore and beseech the world to remain silent no longer. Those in
power must prevent might from coming before right and the seeds of hatred from
being sown which will only cause more evil.
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The expellees responded to this injustice by proclaiming the
Charter of the German Expellees in 1950.195 In the Charter, the ex-
pellees renounce any attempts at revenge or retaliation.' 96 They addi-
tionally state their desire for all nations to work together in a spirit of
brotherly conciliation. 197 However, the Charter also expresses that to
separate a man from his native land by force is to kill his soul. 198 The
Charter demands that all nations recognize, as one the basic rights of
man, the right to the native land of the German expellees. 199 Finally,
the Charter states: "Nations must realize that the fate of the German
expellees, just as that of all refugees, is a world problem, the solution
of which calls for the highest sense of moral responsibility and the
stern necessity of making a tremendous effort.
' '2°°
Forced transfers of population, under any circumstances, are ille-
gal under international law. 20' As the United Nations, in its Interna-
tional Treaty on Prisoners and Refugees, states: "[i]t is the absolute
right of all refugees to return to their homelands from which they
were driven.
' '20 2
Poland is a signator of the United Nations Declaration of
Human Rights.20 3 The policies of Poland towards the Eastern Terri-




Poland and East Germany signed the Treaty of G6rlitz in 1950,
recognizing the Oder-Neisse Line as their official boundary. 20 5 Sup-
porters of the Polish Claim often cite this treaty as conclusive evi-
dence of Germany's acquiescence to the Oder-Neisse Line as a legal
boundary. 20 6 It was the Soviet third of a divided Germany that signed





200. THE GERMAN EAST, supra note 6, at 151.
201. HABEL, supra note 120, at 46-47.
202. Id.
203. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 151.
204. Id.
205. OTro KIMMINICH, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 269 (1990). See also
Kraus, supra note 9, at 66 (purpose is to mark the already established, existing, and inviolable
peace and friendship frontier on the Oder and Lausitz Neisse).
206. LACHS, supra note 134, at 36. See also KLAFKOWSKI, supra note 97, at 25 (Gdrlitz
Agreement as the legal basis which regulated the Polish-German frontier).
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the treaty, however, an ironic fact considering Soviet Foreign Minis-
ter Molotov's statements following the Potsdam Conference. 20 7 Some
Polish writers also attempt to support their position by claiming that
the most interested and directly concerned parties have consented to
the Gorlitz Treaty. 208 The United States Department of State re-
leased the following statement on June 8, 1950: "[O]n no occasion has
the Government of the United States recognized the Oder-Neisse
Line. Nor is the present arrangement between the Polish Govern-
ment and the East German administration recognized by the Govern-
ment of the United States." 209 This statement followed a similar
declaration by the British Foreign Office on June 7 which claimed
that "the British Government considers the Oder-Neisse Line, deline-
ated at Potsdam in June 1945, as only the provisional border between
East Germany and Poland, as long as the border has not been deter-
mined by the peace conference. Great Britain does not take the view
that this line is final."' 210 Along with the United States and British
statements, the French and West German governments also declared
their opposition to the Gorlitz Treaty. 21
1
No peace treaty of any kind can be concluded between nations
still at war.212 When East Germany and Poland signed the Gorlitz
Treaty, a state of war still existed between the Western Powers and
Germany.213 The Allied Powers did not officially end the state of war
with Germany until 1955.214 Thus, the German Democratic Republic
did not have the power to negotiate agreements on behalf of all of
Germany. 215 As Dr. Kraus states:
[T]he chief argument against the legality of the G6rlitz Treaty is
that the Soviet zone has no legal capacity in international law (in-
ternational legal subjectivity) and its de facto Government set up
by an outside power holds no capacity to act in international law.
An important condition for subjectivity in international law is that
207. "We are naturally in principle in favor of concluding a peace treaty with Germany;
but before such a treaty can be concluded a single German Government must be formed ......
BOHLER, supra note 5, at 48.
208. LACHS, supra note 134.
209. GERMANY'S EASTERN TERRITORIES, supra note 6, at 3.
210. Id. at 4.
211. voN WILPERT, supra note 33, at 86-88. See also WOLFRAM E. HANREIDER, THE
STABLE CRISIS 89 (1970) (The Bonn government adamantly refused to regard the territorial
status quo in that area as anything but provisional and subject to revision.).
212. BOHLER, supra note 5, at 49.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. DE ZAYAS, supra note 181, at 154-55.
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a country should have a government of its own and not be under
orders from an outside power (sovereignty).
216
The United States reaffirmed this position on October 12, 1949, one
year before the signing of the Gorlitz Treaty:
The United States government considers that the so-called [Ger-
man Democratic Republic] established on October 7 in Berlin, is
without any legal validity or foundation in the popular will ....
The eastern government rests on no constitution written by demo-
cratic representatives of the states of the Soviet zone .... Such a
government cannot claim by any democratic standard to speak for
the German people of the Soviet zone; much less can it claim to
speak in the name of Germany as a whole .... The United States
government and the governments associated with it will ... con-
tinue to give full support to the government of the [Federal Repub-
lic of Germany] at Bonn in its efforts to restore a truly free and
democratic Germany.
2 17
A. 1970 Warsaw Agreement
The Warsaw Treaty of 1970, signed by West Germany and Po-
land, establishes clear international obligations binding the two na-
tions. 21 8 The pertinent text of the Warsaw Treaty reads:
The Polish People's Republic and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many .... Conscious of the fact that the inviolability of the fron-
tiers of all European States and respect for their territorial integrity
and sovereignty within their present frontiers are a basic condition
for peace .... have agreed as follows:
Article I
1. The Polish People's Republic and the Federal Republic of
Germany agree that the existing frontier line, which, in accordance
with chapter IX of the decisions of the Potsdam Conference of 2
August 1945, runs from the Baltic Sea immediately west of
Swinemuinde along the Oder River to the point of junction with the
Lausitzer Neisse River and along the Lausitzer Neisse River to the
frontier with Czechoslovakia, constitutes the western State frontier
of the Polish People's Republic.
2. They confirm the inviolability of their existing frontiers, now
and hereafter, and pledge absolute respect for each other's territo-
rial integrity.
216. Kraus, supra note 9, at 42-43.
217. Dean Acheson, Statement on the Illegality of the East German Government (Oct. 12,
1949), reprinted in GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 138, at 11.
218. KIMMINICH, supra note 205, at 270.
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3. They declare that they have no territorial claims against each
other and will advance none in the future ....
Article IV
This Agreement shall be without prejudice to any bilateral or mul-
tilateral international agreements which the Parties have previ-
ously concluded or which affect them.
219
While the Warsaw Treaty clearly establishes international obligations
on behalf of each nation, it does not define the terms of the obliga-
tions. The context surrounding the Warsaw Treaty better explains its
scope and meaning.
Poland contends that the Warsaw Treaty contains Germany's of-
ficial and binding recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line as the perma-
nent western boundary of Poland.220 Indeed, this conclusion might
follow from the language of the Warsaw Treaty. A general rule of
customary international law, however, holds that "a state succeeds to
the territorial limits of her predecessor: she gains no more and no less
territory upon succession. ' 221 The Allied Powers of World War II
kept the German Reich alive in the form of its delegates, which were
the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic
Republic. 2
22
For the purposes of international law and the consummation of
treaties, the Reich still exists. The German unification confirmed the
integrity of a unified Reich, and the Reich has not since entered into
any treaties renouncing claims to territory.
223
The German government interprets the Warsaw Treaty as apply-
ing to its frontiers as of December 31, 1937.224 Wladyslaw Czaplin-
ski, a Senior Researcher at the West Institute of Poznan, sets forth the
German position as follows:
It did so by keeping in force municipal regulations that treated part
of Polish territory (the former German Eastern Territories) as still
belonging to the German Reich and not as 'foreign territory' (Aus-
land). Under Article 23 of the Basic Law (the West German Con-
219. Agreement Concerning the Basis for Normalization of Their Mutual Relations, Dec.
7, 1970, F.R.G. - Pol., 830 U.N.T.S. 329, 334 [hereinafter Agreement].
220. Ludwik Gelberg, The Warsaw Treaty of 1970 and the Western Boundary of Poland,
76 AM. J. INT'L L. 119, 128 (1982). See also KiMMINICH, supra note 205, at 270 (the territo-
rial questions connected with the Oder-Neisse line are settled by the Warsaw Treaty).
221. BOHLER, supra note 5, at 81.
222. Id. at 80.
223. Id.
224. Wladyslaw Czaplinski, The New Polish-German Treaties and the Changing Political
Structure of Europe, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 163, 165 (1992).
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stitution), these territories were entitled to join the [Federal
Republic of Germany]. In addition, a large number of Polish na-
tionals were treated as "Germans" within the meaning of Article
116(1) of the Basic Law.225
This position not only is consistent with the above-mentioned princi-
ples of international law, but also with Article IV of the Warsaw
Treaty. 22 6 The Treaty clearly states that it does not overrule any prior
agreements affecting the two nations.2 27 As discussed above, the Al-
lied Powers used the 1937 German-Polish frontier as a basis for nego-
tiations. Furthermore, Germany's intention in signing the Treaty was
to improve German-Polish relations, without giving up its legal claim
to the Oder-Neisse Territories. 228
B. 1975 Helsinki Accord
In 1975, the United States, Canada, and each nation in Europe
entered into the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
held in Helsinki, Finland ("Helsinki Accord"). 229 The Final Act of
the Conference, signed by all participants, contained provisions on
sovereignty, frontiers, territorial integrity and self-determination. 230
The Helsinki Accord affirmed the principles expressed in both the
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of
225. Id.
226. Czaplinski states that Polish authorities consider the German position as contrary to
international law under Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (no state
can invoke its municipal law to avoid implementing international agreements). The Warsaw
Treaty, however, allows bilateral and multilateral agreements affecting Germany and Poland
to stand. The Allied Powers created the document that became the West German Constitution
(Basic Law), and any decisions pursuant to that law are valid. Id. at 166.
227. Agreement, supra note 219.
228. BOHLER, supra note 5, at 84-85.
229. Id. at 83.
230. The pertinent sections of the Act are as follows:
I. Sovereign Equality, Respect for the Rights Inherent in Sovereignty
The participating States will respect each other's sovereign equality and individ-
uality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, includ-
ing in particular the right of every State to juridicial equality, to territorial integrity
and to freedom and political independence ....
Within the framework of international law, all the participating States have
equal rights and duties .... They consider that their frontiers can be changed, in
accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.
III. Inviolability of Frontiers
The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as
the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the
future from assaulting these frontiers.
Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and
usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.
IV. Territorial Integrity of States
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Human Rights, in that sovereignty and self-determination are inviola-
ble rights.2
31
The Helsinki Accord, by proclaiming the inviolability of the cur-
rent European frontiers, also affirmed the 1937 German borders. 232
Although the Helsinki Accord does not address the Oder-Neisse Line
explicitly, the existing German frontiers at the time of the Helsinki
Accord included the Eastern Territories. 233 More importantly, how-
ever, Germany signed the agreement in order to negotiate modest im-
provements in intra-German relations, and to secure equal rights for
the German minorities living under Polish rule.234 The Helsinki Ac-
cord clearly provides for the self-determination of the German minor-
ities living under Polish rule235 because it grants them the right to
freely determine their political status.236
The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the partic-
ipating States.
Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity,
political independence or the unity of any participating State, and in particular from
any such action constituting a threat or use of force.
The participating States will likewise refrain from making each other's territory
the object of military occupation or other direct or indirect measures of force in
contravention of international law, or the object of acquisition by means of such
measures or the threat of them. No such occupation or acquisition will be recog-
nized as legal ....
VIII. Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples
The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to
self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international
law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States. By virtue of the princi-
ple of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the
right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and exter-
nal political status, without external interference ... The participating States reaf-
firm the universal significance of respect for and effective exercise of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples for the development of friendly relations among them-
selves as among all States; they also recall the importance of the elimination of any
form of violation of this principle.
HUMAN RIGHTS, EUROPEAN POLITICS, AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD: THE DOCUMENTARY
EVOLUTION OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE 185, 187-
88, 190 (Igor Kavass et al. eds., 1981).
231. Id.
232. Although Biihler states that the existing frontiers of 1970 were those of 1945, his
statement can also mean that the existing frontiers of 1975 were those of 1937, since no legally
valid international agreements altered the German-Polish border during this time. BOHLER,
supra note 5, at 85.
233. Id.
234. DE ZAYAS, supra note 181, at 178-79.
235. Antonio Cassese, The Helsinki Declaration and Self-Determination, in HUMAN
RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD 83, 100 (Thomas Buergenthal
ed., 1977).
236. Id. at 102.
Loy. L.A. Int7 & Comp. L.JI[
C. Reunification of Germany
On October 3, 1990, the German Democratic Republic joined
the Federal Republic of Germany as part of a new and unified Ger-
man state. The Moscow Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect
to Germany ("Moscow Treaty") describes the procedure for reunifi-
cation.237 The Moscow Treaty provides:
Article 1
(1) The united Germany shall comprise the territory of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic and
the whole of Berlin. Its external borders shall be the borders of the
Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Re-
public and shall be definitive from the date on which the present
Treaty comes into force;
(2) The united Germany and the Republic of Poland shall confirm
the existing border between them in a treaty that is binding under
international law.
Article 2
The parties declare that the border which exists between them is
inviolable now and for the future and they agree to respect uncon-
ditionally their sovereignty and territorial integrity.238
In accordance with Article 23 of the Federal Constitution, the states
of the former German Democratic Republic became part of Germany
upon their accession. 239 Additionally, under Article 1(2) of the Mos-
cow Treaty, Germany and the Republic of Poland signed a separate
treaty on November 14, 1990, confirming the existing border between
them.240 The legislatures of each nation ratified this treaty in January,
1992.241
Contrary to the treaties of G6rlitz and Warsaw, and the inten-
tions stated at Yalta and Potsdam, a unified German government
signed the 1990 treaty confirming the Oder-Neisse Line as the border
between Germany and Poland. As in 1970, Germany signing the
1990 treaty again showed its desire to improve German-Polish rela-
tions.242 Poland subsequently agreed to pursue friendly relations with
Germany, even to the extent of granting limited autonomy for the
237. Jochen Frowein, The Reunification of Germany, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 152 (1992). Peter
E. Quint, The Constitutional Law of German Unification, 50 MD. L. REv. 613 (1991).
238. Frowein, supra note 237, at 155.
239. Id. at 154.
240. Id. at 155.
241. Id.
242. Czaplinski, supra note 224, at 166.
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German population in the Eastern Territories. 243  The Moscow
Treaty, however, contradicts the overarching principles of the United
Nations Declaration of Human Rights and other established princi-
ples of international law regarding the transfer of territory. 24"
The Moscow Treaty leaves open the question of whether it incor-
porates the illegal annexations by the Soviet Union in World War II
into its provisions. The United States Senate was unwilling to accept
the annexations of the Baltic States as part of the Moscow Treaty; it
should be equally unwilling to accept the legalization of Poland's So-
viet-orchestrated annexation of the Eastern Territories of Ger-
many. 245 In his proclamation on the day of German reunification,
United States President George Bush stated the following:
The achievement of German unity will also give hope to others,
particularly the Baltic peoples, that a peaceful but determined
struggle for national self-determination can succeed even over
seemingly insurmountable obstacles. The United States remains
true to its policy of nonrecognition of the annexation of the Baltic
states, just as we never wavered in our support for German unity
even through the darkest hours of the cold war.2 4 6
United States support for German unity must remain intact until all
of Germany is reunified.
The central legal issue affecting such reunification is the right of
refugees and expellees to return to their homelands. 247 While the
1992 ratification of a border treaty between Poland and Germany rec-
ognizes the current boundary as a fact of political geography, these
political considerations cannot forfeit the inherent legal right of living
Germans to their ancestral and birth homelands. 248 The right to self-
determination does not exclude those legal inhabitants of East Prus-
sia, Pomerania, and Silesia who now reside in the Federal Republic of
Germany.24
9
In the hierarchy of considerations weighed in territorial disputes,
the right to one's homeland takes precedence over political, economic
243. Id. at 167.
244. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
245. Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Interna-
tional Law (World War II: German Reunification), 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 166-67 (1991).
246. Id.
247. SIEGRID KROLLE, DIE VOLKERRECHTLICHEN ASPEKTE DES ODER-NEI3E-
PROBLEMS 359-62 (1970).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 364-66.
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and security considerations.250 This right cannot be negotiated or dis-
missed in the interests of political expediency. 25I The Moscow Treaty
was an expediency based upon the rapid destabilization of govern-
ments in the German Democratic Republic and Soviet Union. The
Moscow Treaty, like the Yalta and Teheran protocols, 252 did not con-
sider the rights of displaced Germans as stated in the United Nations
Charter,25 3 Resolutions, 25 4 and Declaration on Human Rights,25 5 and
thus falls into the same category as the Yalta and Teheran protocols.
While the Moscow Treaty, like the G6rlitz Treaty of 1950, was signed
by heads of state, it does not de facto have the force of international
law because it rests on contradictions of established international legal
precedence.
VI. CONCLUSION
Both historically and legally, East Prussia, Pomerania, and Sile-
sia are German territories. Germanic peoples originally settled these
areas and they carry a strong German influence to the present day.
The Soviet Union and Poland have attempted to annex the Eastern
Territories, in violation of the international legal principles of self-
determination, annexation and human rights. They have attempted
to legalize this action through modern treaties. Despite the Soviet
and Polish attempts, the Territories still belong to Germany. Addi-
tionally, the reunification of Germany will not be complete until the
borders of 1937 are restored, and all German citizens are unified into
a single German state.
Although the 1990 German-Polish treaty confirming their border
appears permanent, nothing is final in international law. For exam-
ple, Article Seven of the Moscow Treaty states: "The Four Powers
terminate their rights and responsibilities relating to Berlin and to
Germany as a whole .... Accordingly, the corresponding, related
quadripartite agreements, decisions and practices are terminated and
all related Four-Power institutions are also dissolved. ' ' 256 If countries
could make a treaty provision immune to all future international
agreements, Article Seven, ratified by the United States, Soviet Union,
250. HERBERT MARZIAN, POLITISCHER REALISMUS 82 (1969).
251. DEUTSCHLAND UND POLEN, supra note 155, at 211.
252. See supra notes 61-71, 72-86 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
256. Leich, supra note 245, at 163 (emphasis added).
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France, United Kingdom, German Democratic Republic and Federal
Republic of Germany could not stand. Countries remain free to
change treaty provisions, and the Moscow Treaty is no exception.
Those opposed to the reunification of Germany, once considered
it an impossibility. As the Polish writer, Ludwik Gelberg, wrote in
1982:
The allusion of ... West German circles to the possibility that
revision of the boundaries with their neighbors will become the or-
der of the day if the two German states are unified must naturally
keep a policy of territorial revisionism alive in the [Federal Repub-
lic of Germany]. Such attitudes can make life difficult - if not
totally destroy - the already very slight, unrealistic prospects for
the unification of Germany.
257
The borders that the Allies drew in World War II aimed to create a
buffer between the Soviet Union and the West, and to weaken Ger-
many. In the current, increasingly democratic world, these policies
no longer exist, and those oudated borders should no longer hold legal
status. The world has repudiated all of Stalin's legacy. The Oder-
Neisse Line, however, continues as a testimony to the territorial ambi-
tions and international manipulations of this dictator.
To avoid future aggression in Europe, all nations must be treated
fairly according to accepted principles of international law. The inter-
national community must repudiate forcible annexations and embrace
the right of self-determination. The world must correct the grave
wrongs committed under the ideas of Clemenceau and Morgenthau,
so that a truly lasting peace will ensue. The nations of the world must
redraw their boundaries along legal, historical and social lines. Fu-
ture governments cannot accept illegal international borders merely
because they happen to exist. There can be no peace without justice.
David E. Lehman*
257. Gelberg, supra note 220, at 129.
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